保存桌面快捷方式 - - 设为首页 - 手机版
凹丫丫旗下网站:四字成语大全 - 故事大全 - 范文大全
您现在的位置: 范文大全 >> 法律论文 >> 国际经济法论文 >> 正文

WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(4)


recognize that national governments often have legitimate reasons for decisions they take. And more generally, panels should keep in mind that a broad-based, multilateral international institution must contend with a wide variety of legal, political, and cultural values, which counsel in favor of caution toward interpreting treaty obligations that may be appropriate to one society but not to other participants.13
However, panels must understand the central role of GATT/WTO adjudicatory system plays in enhancing the implementation, effectiveness, and credibility of the elaborate sets of rules for which the WTO has been created. Successful cooperation among nationa

l authorities to a large extent rests with the institutions given the responsibility to help carry out the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Thus, when a particular national authority’s activity or decision would undermine the effectiveness of WTO rules, or would establish a practice that could trigger damaging activities by other member countries, panels will undoubtedly show less deference. 14
To sum up, with this articulation of the standard of review based on Art. 11 of the DSU, a de novo review would be inappropriate. However, to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. The applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor “total deference”, but rather the “objective assessment”. However, when may a panel be regarded as having failed to discharge its duty under Art. 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment? As is what to be discussed in more detail below.

IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), the European Communities claims that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts as required by Art. 11 of the DSU, and asks the Appellate Body to reverse the findings so arrived at by the Panel. The Appellate Body finds concerning this appeal that:15
“[…] Clearly, not every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts. In the present appeal, the European Communities repeatedly claims that the Panel disregarded or distorted or misrepresented the evidence submitted by the European Communities and even the opinions expressed by the Panel's own expert advisors. The duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel's duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. The wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts. ‘Disregard’ and ‘distortion’ and ‘misrepresentation’ of the evidence, in their ordinary signification in judicial and quasi-judicial processes, imply not simply an error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of a panel. A claim that a panel disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted to it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, denied the party submitt

WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(4)(第6页)
本文链接地址:http://www.oyaya.net/fanwen/view/141987.html

★温馨提示:你可以返回到 国际经济法论文 也可以利用本站页顶的站内搜索功能查找你想要的文章。